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tgseclib/phpseclib/Crypt/Random.php
Andreas Fischer 727dba5905 [remove-svn-version-lines] Remove useless @version: $Id$ lines.
These lines served some purpose on SVN, but are now useless on Git. They
actually do harm as they might make people think their files are older
than they actually are.
2013-06-02 18:50:46 +02:00

250 lines
11 KiB
PHP

<?php
/* vim: set expandtab tabstop=4 shiftwidth=4 softtabstop=4: */
/**
* Random Number Generator
*
* PHP versions 4 and 5
*
* Here's a short example of how to use this library:
* <code>
* <?php
* include('Crypt/Random.php');
*
* echo bin2hex(crypt_random_string(8));
* ?>
* </code>
*
* LICENSE: Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
* of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
* in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
* to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
* AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
* THE SOFTWARE.
*
* @category Crypt
* @package Crypt_Random
* @author Jim Wigginton <terrafrost@php.net>
* @copyright MMVII Jim Wigginton
* @license http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.html MIT License
* @link http://phpseclib.sourceforge.net
*/
/**
* "Is Windows" test
*
* @access private
*/
define('CRYPT_RANDOM_IS_WINDOWS', strtoupper(substr(PHP_OS, 0, 3)) === 'WIN');
/**
* Generate a random string.
*
* Although microoptimizations are generally discouraged as they impair readability this function is ripe with
* microoptimizations because this function has the potential of being called a huge number of times.
* eg. for RSA key generation.
*
* @param Integer $length
* @return String
* @access public
*/
function crypt_random_string($length)
{
if (CRYPT_RANDOM_IS_WINDOWS) {
// method 1. prior to PHP 5.3 this would call rand() on windows hence the function_exists('class_alias') call.
// ie. class_alias is a function that was introduced in PHP 5.3
if (function_exists('mcrypt_create_iv') && function_exists('class_alias')) {
return mcrypt_create_iv($length);
}
// method 2. openssl_random_pseudo_bytes was introduced in PHP 5.3.0 but prior to PHP 5.3.4 there was,
// to quote <http://php.net/ChangeLog-5.php#5.3.4>, "possible blocking behavior". as of 5.3.4
// openssl_random_pseudo_bytes and mcrypt_create_iv do the exact same thing on Windows. ie. they both
// call php_win32_get_random_bytes():
//
// https://github.com/php/php-src/blob/7014a0eb6d1611151a286c0ff4f2238f92c120d6/ext/openssl/openssl.c#L5008
// https://github.com/php/php-src/blob/7014a0eb6d1611151a286c0ff4f2238f92c120d6/ext/mcrypt/mcrypt.c#L1392
//
// php_win32_get_random_bytes() is defined thusly:
//
// https://github.com/php/php-src/blob/7014a0eb6d1611151a286c0ff4f2238f92c120d6/win32/winutil.c#L80
//
// we're calling it, all the same, in the off chance that the mcrypt extension is not available
if (function_exists('openssl_random_pseudo_bytes') && version_compare(PHP_VERSION, '5.3.4', '>=')) {
return openssl_random_pseudo_bytes($length);
}
} else {
// method 1. the fastest
if (function_exists('openssl_random_pseudo_bytes')) {
return openssl_random_pseudo_bytes($length);
}
// method 2
static $fp = true;
if ($fp === true) {
// warning's will be output unles the error suppression operator is used. errors such as
// "open_basedir restriction in effect", "Permission denied", "No such file or directory", etc.
$fp = @fopen('/dev/urandom', 'rb');
}
if ($fp !== true && $fp !== false) { // surprisingly faster than !is_bool() or is_resource()
return fread($fp, $length);
}
// method 3. pretty much does the same thing as method 2 per the following url:
// https://github.com/php/php-src/blob/7014a0eb6d1611151a286c0ff4f2238f92c120d6/ext/mcrypt/mcrypt.c#L1391
// surprisingly slower than method 2. maybe that's because mcrypt_create_iv does a bunch of error checking that we're
// not doing. regardless, this'll only be called if this PHP script couldn't open /dev/urandom due to open_basedir
// restrictions or some such
if (function_exists('mcrypt_create_iv')) {
return mcrypt_create_iv($length, MCRYPT_DEV_URANDOM);
}
}
// at this point we have no choice but to use a pure-PHP CSPRNG
// cascade entropy across multiple PHP instances by fixing the session and collecting all
// environmental variables, including the previous session data and the current session
// data.
//
// mt_rand seeds itself by looking at the PID and the time, both of which are (relatively)
// easy to guess at. linux uses mouse clicks, keyboard timings, etc, as entropy sources, but
// PHP isn't low level to be able to use those as sources and on a web server there's not likely
// going to be a ton of keyboard or mouse action. web servers do have one thing that we can use
// however. a ton of people visiting the website. obviously you don't want to base your seeding
// soley on parameters a potential attacker sends but (1) not everything in $_SERVER is controlled
// by the user and (2) this isn't just looking at the data sent by the current user - it's based
// on the data sent by all users. one user requests the page and a hash of their info is saved.
// another user visits the page and the serialization of their data is utilized along with the
// server envirnment stuff and a hash of the previous http request data (which itself utilizes
// a hash of the session data before that). certainly an attacker should be assumed to have
// full control over his own http requests. he, however, is not going to have control over
// everyone's http requests.
static $crypto = false, $v;
if ($crypto === false) {
// save old session data
$old_session_id = session_id();
$old_use_cookies = ini_get('session.use_cookies');
$old_session_cache_limiter = session_cache_limiter();
if (isset($_SESSION)) {
$_OLD_SESSION = $_SESSION;
}
if ($old_session_id != '') {
session_write_close();
}
session_id(1);
ini_set('session.use_cookies', 0);
session_cache_limiter('');
session_start();
$v = $seed = $_SESSION['seed'] = pack('H*', sha1(
serialize($_SERVER) .
serialize($_POST) .
serialize($_GET) .
serialize($_COOKIE) .
serialize($GLOBALS) .
serialize($_SESSION) .
serialize($_OLD_SESSION)
));
if (!isset($_SESSION['count'])) {
$_SESSION['count'] = 0;
}
$_SESSION['count']++;
session_write_close();
// restore old session data
if ($old_session_id != '') {
session_id($old_session_id);
session_start();
ini_set('session.use_cookies', $old_use_cookies);
session_cache_limiter($old_session_cache_limiter);
} else {
if (isset($_OLD_SESSION)) {
$_SESSION = $_OLD_SESSION;
unset($_OLD_SESSION);
} else {
unset($_SESSION);
}
}
// in SSH2 a shared secret and an exchange hash are generated through the key exchange process.
// the IV client to server is the hash of that "nonce" with the letter A and for the encryption key it's the letter C.
// if the hash doesn't produce enough a key or an IV that's long enough concat successive hashes of the
// original hash and the current hash. we'll be emulating that. for more info see the following URL:
//
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#section-7.2
//
// see the is_string($crypto) part for an example of how to expand the keys
$key = pack('H*', sha1($seed . 'A'));
$iv = pack('H*', sha1($seed . 'C'));
// ciphers are used as per the nist.gov link below. also, see this link:
//
// http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographically_secure_pseudorandom_number_generator#Designs_based_on_cryptographic_primitives
switch (true) {
case class_exists('Crypt_AES'):
$crypto = new Crypt_AES(CRYPT_AES_MODE_CTR);
break;
case class_exists('Crypt_TripleDES'):
$crypto = new Crypt_TripleDES(CRYPT_DES_MODE_CTR);
break;
case class_exists('Crypt_DES'):
$crypto = new Crypt_DES(CRYPT_DES_MODE_CTR);
break;
case class_exists('Crypt_RC4'):
$crypto = new Crypt_RC4();
break;
default:
$crypto = $seed;
return crypt_random_string($length);
}
$crypto->setKey($key);
$crypto->setIV($iv);
$crypto->enableContinuousBuffer();
}
if (is_string($crypto)) {
// the following is based off of ANSI X9.31:
//
// http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/rng/931rngext.pdf
//
// OpenSSL uses that same standard for it's random numbers:
//
// http://www.opensource.apple.com/source/OpenSSL/OpenSSL-38/openssl/fips-1.0/rand/fips_rand.c
// (do a search for "ANS X9.31 A.2.4")
//
// ANSI X9.31 recommends ciphers be used and phpseclib does use them if they're available (see
// later on in the code) but if they're not we'll use sha1
$result = '';
while (strlen($result) < $length) { // each loop adds 20 bytes
// microtime() isn't packed as "densely" as it could be but then neither is that the idea.
// the idea is simply to ensure that each "block" has a unique element to it.
$i = pack('H*', sha1(microtime()));
$r = pack('H*', sha1($i ^ $v));
$v = pack('H*', sha1($r ^ $i));
$result.= $r;
}
return substr($result, 0, $length);
}
//return $crypto->encrypt(str_repeat("\0", $length));
$result = '';
while (strlen($result) < $length) {
$i = $crypto->encrypt(microtime());
$r = $crypto->encrypt($i ^ $v);
$v = $crypto->encrypt($r ^ $i);
$result.= $r;
}
return substr($result, 0, $length);
}